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Inferactive data analysis
Nan Bi, Jelena Markovic, Lucy Xia and Jonathan Taylor
Abstract: We describe inferactive data analysis, so-named to denote an interactive approach
to data analysis with an emphasis on inference after data analysis. Our approach is a compro-
mise between Tukey’s exploratory (roughly speaking “model free”) and confirmatory data analysis
(roughly speaking classical and “model based”), also allowing for Bayesian data analysis. We view
this approach as close in spirit to current practice of applied statisticians and data scientists while
allowing frequentist guarantees for results to be reported in the scientific literature, or Bayesian
results where the data scientist may choose the statistical model (and hence the prior) after some
initial exploratory analysis.
While this approach to data analysis does not cover every scenario, and every possible algorithm
data scientists may use, we see this as a useful step in concrete providing tools (with frequentist
statistical guarantees) for current data scientists.
The basis of inference we use is selective inference [Lee et al., 2016, Fithian et al., 2014], in par-
ticular its randomized form Tian and Taylor [2015a]. The randomized framework, besides providing
additional power and shorter confidence intervals, also provides explicit forms for relevant reference
distributions (up to normalization) through the selective sampler of Tian et al. [2016]. The reference
distributions are constructed from a particular conditional distribution formed from what we call
a DAG-DAG – a Data Analysis Generative DAG. As sampling conditional distributions in DAGs
is generally complex, the selective sampler is crucial to any practical implementation of inferactive
data analysis.
Our principal goal is in reviewing the recent developments in selective inference as well as
describing the general philosophy of selective inference.
The idea of a scientist, struck, as if by lightning with a question, is far from the truth. – Tukey [1980].
1. Introduction
We begin by describing what we might call a typical day / week / quarter in an applied statistician or
data scientist’s working life. In this work, we will typically use the term data scientist rather than applied
statistician, not only because such terms are en vogue at the moment, but, as we will see, our approach to
data analysis actually considers the applied statistician a scientist, running “experiments” of their own.
We think of our data scientists as somewhat subordinate to a scientist running experiments that sample
some process. With a dataset in hand, data scientists are tasked with discovering structure in it, reporting
this structure to their scientist colleagues and ultimately the scientific literature. To achieve this goal, a
data scientist will commonly do some exploratory data analysis given by a sequence of queries (in silico
function evaluations) based on their interests and knowledge existing statistical toolboxes. The goal of
such queries is exploratory in nature, perhaps trying to discover interesting structure or features that
might be used in modelling further down the pipeline.
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/The philosophy of selective inference 2
Sometimes, based on the results from previous queries, they may decide to consult from sources such as
existing literature, and make additional queries to extract more information. Based on this information,
hypotheses of interest are formed, often with corresponding parameters or targets of interest. For these
parameters, a data scientist is tasked with producing a report for the scientist to publish in the scientific
literature.
It is at this point in the data scientist’s every day work that data analysis conflicts with classical
statistical inference. While it is natural that a data scientist will want to explore their data to find
hypotheses of interest, classical mathematical statistics relies on having specified a statistical model
before observing the data. This conflict is well-documented in the literature. For instance, Diaconis
[1981] compares this application of classical mathematical statistics in this context to a primitive ritual,
while referring to exploratory data analysis as a form magical thinking. Diaconis also references Leamer
[1978] who also has some interesting descriptions of this conflict. As pointed out by Leamer [1978] this
conflict essentially predates statistics, and was recognized by Sherlock Holmes:
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories,
instead of theories to suit facts. – Doyle [1892]
Diaconis [1981] ultimately leaves some room for magical thinking in mathematical statistics in the
form of a “working hypothesis.” In this work, the concept of “working hypothesis” is directly related to
the statistical model of Section 3 our data scientist chooses based on what he has observed about the
data.
This conflict in the way a data scientist approaches data analysis and the way a mathematical statisti-
cian produces tools for inference has very important implications for how data is used to further science. It
needs no acknowledgment that reporting p-values or confidence intervals based on classical mathematical
statistics have no guarantee if the same data is used to both generate the hypotheses of interest as well
as construct the report. Breiman [2001] called this the “quiet scandal of statistics”, pointing out that
statisticians know that the guarantees they provide only apply without data snooping. On the flipside,
data scientists are not completely innocent: Leamer [1978] referred to the use of such methods in science
as a fundamental (perhaps original) sin of a data scientist.
Recent work in selective inference has attempted to address this scandal and provide data scientists
with tools to construct reports with at least some form of statistical guarantees. Roughly speaking, these
approaches can be described as either simultaneous inference [Berk et al., 2013], in which a certain class
of statistical functionals is determined before looking at the data and coverage guarantees are constructed
simultaneously over the entire class, or selective inference [Fithian et al., 2014, Lee et al., 2016, Tibshirani
et al., 2016] which conditions on the outcome of some model selection query to construct a reference
distribution.
In this work, we take the conditional approach, i.e. selective inference, recognizing that many data
scientists do not have a clear enumeration of possible questions of interest before they see a typical data
set. Indeed, one of the great things about science is that data can (and should) have the ability to make
a scientist (and hence a data scientist) change their mind about the data generating process in question.
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In the context of inference, this change of mind may manifest itself by changing the statistical model
used to construct the relevant statistical results. This notion of introducing a different statistical model
based on observations about a dataset was introduced in Fithian et al. [2014] as a selected model in which
the selected model was described formally as if chosen by an algorithm. In practice, this model can and
should be chosen in consultation with the scientist who measured the data along with the results of the
data scientist’s query. As mentioned above, this statistical model is a formal version of Diaconis [1981]’s
working hypothesis. After U (for user) has chosen a suitable model for the data, U ’s working hypothesis
must be adjusted to reflect the fact that he has used the data to discover this hypothesis. This adjustment
is formally done by conditioning on what U has observed before forming this model. This conditioning
results in a new statistical model, the selective model described in Section 3.1.
Our ultimate goal is to describe a new “theory” of data analysis that add to the existing theories of
Diaconis [1981]: inferactive data analysis which uses the conditional approach of selective inference as
its basic building block. In a formal sense, this form of inference is just classical mathematical inference
applied to a selective model. Formal justification for such results are not presented here, and can be
found in Tian et al. [2016], Tian and Taylor [2015a], Markovic and Taylor [2016], Tibshirani et al. [2015],
Markovic et al. [2017]. Our goal here is to provide the reader with a description of the general viewpoint
and the main concepts needed to carry out this program.
1.1. Example: HIV resistance data
As an illustration of the ideas discussed here, we consider at a real dataset studied in Rhee et al. [2006],
Tian et al. [2016]. The authors studied the genetic basis of drug resistance in HIV using markers of
inhibitor mutations to predict a quantitative measurement of susceptibility to several antiretroviral drugs.
The goal is to find the mutations that predict responses to drugs. In particular, we take the protease
inhibitor subset of their data (“HIV dataset”) and we are interested in one specific drug, Lamivudine
(3TC). There are 633 cases and 91 different mutations occurring more than 10 times in the sample.
A data scientist is tasked with building a regression model for this data. Let U denote our data scientist.
Our user U decides to first investigate which mutations have the largest marginal effect in determining
resistance to 3TC. This query can be answered by marginal screening [Fan and Lv, 2008, Genovese et al.,
2012]. The mutations with a marginal Z-statistic with value greater than 2.5 are
[P35I, P39A, P41L, P43Q, P67N, P74I, P74V, P83K, P118I, P184V, P200A, P208Y, P210W,
P211K, P215Y, P219E, P228H].
Having observed the most important marginal effects, U decides to run LASSO [Tibshirani, 1996a] with
features given by these mutations as well as their interactions to discover whether there are any important
interactions between mutations. The user U uses LASSO with a fixed value of the regularization parameter
based on theoretical considerations (c.f. Negahban et al. [2012]), where U uses an estimate of σ2 from
the full model with 91 mutations. The resulting mutations are
[P67N, P83K, P118I, P184V, P210W, P215Y, P228H, P67N:P83K, P67N:P184V, P67N:P211K,
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P83K:P184V, P184V:P210W, ’P184V:P215Y’, P200A:P210W].
Given that U has observed these facts about the data, what report should they produce? Which
features should U use in the model reported? We argue that U , in conjunction with the scientist can
choose which model to report – this is the selected model. Having fixed a model, how should U produce
confidence intervals and / or p-values?
1.1.1. What is valid inference: a tale of two data scientists
Of course, a different data scientist (whom we will call U 1) may have made different decisions – data
analysis can be a highly subjective enterprise. Suppose U 1 had instead chosen to run LASSO on all
91 mutations in the first stage instead perhaps using a similar choice of regularization parameter. The
resulting mutations are
[P41L, P62V, P65R, P67N, P83K, P151M, P181C, P184V, P210W, P211K, P215F, P215Y].
In a second step, the data scientist again runs LASSO using the most commonly co-occuring mutations.
The results are
[P62V, P65R, P67N, P83K, P151M, P181C, P184V, P210W, P211K, P215F, P215Y, P41L:P184V,
P41L:P210W, P62V:P184V, P62V:P215Y, P67N:P184V, P67N:P211K, P83K:P184V, P181C:P184V,
P181C:P211K, P184V:P210W, P184V:P215Y].
We see that the “important effects” that U and U 1 have discovered are different. This is to be expected
as they evaluated different functions on the data. Hence, if they were to create reports with p-values
or confidence intervals using the standard methods from linear regression to publish in the scientific
literature, they will typically have different variables in them. This begs the question: which of U and U 1
has produced a valid report?
The short answer most statisticians would give is most likely neither, as both U and U 1 have ignored the
effect of selection. Selective inference provides tools that would allow U and U 1 to account for selection.
Are both reports now correct? In general, no. Confidence intervals and p-values are always defined relative
to some statistical model – if the statistical model is badly misspecified then even adjusted for selection
it is likely badly misspecified. On the other hand, suppose that both U and U 1 will form intervals or
test hypotheses about population parameters under the assumption that our 633 cases were samplied
IID from some population of HIV+ patients. In this case, as long as they have properly accounted for
selection both reports will be statistically valid in the large sample limit, though readers of the scientific
literature should be careful about interpreting these parameters as if some underlying parametric model
is correct. This caveat of course stands whether or not U and U 1 have used the data to choose what to
report.
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1.1.2. Is all exploratory analysis the same?
While our framework allows for production of valid results for both U and U 1 (at least in certain situ-
ations), it does not mean that we should be completely agnostic about the role of the data scientist in
producing these results. For example, suppose U is research scientist with many years devoted to under-
standing and modelling resistance to different drugs and U 1 is a freshman student in a data science class.
Imagine then a data set for a new HIV drug for which the goal is to understand resistance based on mu-
tation pattern. Expert U uses well-established methods within the field to discover important mutations,
while U 1 runs through a list of different techniques presented in class and others discovered online.
After their exploration, suppose U and U 1 arrive at the same list of important mutations and decide
that they would like to report p-values in a given regression model with these mutations. Whose results
should we trust more? How is this reflected in the resulting report? In the framework described below, we
will require that both U and U 1 declare the exploration they have done and, from our description above,
U will have a simpler description then U 1.
We might represent this exploration as the sequence of in silico function evaluations each has used
yielding two different dependency graphs (understood here in the sense of computer science) with the data
as the top node. We see that U ’s dependency graph will likely be simpler than U 1’s. Selective inference
takes the viewpoint that we should condition on our exploration of the data (in this case the nodes
reflecting functions evaluated on the data) so as not to bias our final results. In this context, we would
expect to be conditioning on “less” in U ’s graph compared to U 1. As conditioning on more decreases
leftover information [Fithian et al., 2014], we can expect this to result in U having more powerful tests
than U 1.
Is such a decrease in power reasonable and / or desirable? If we take the viewpoint that one must
condition after exploration (so that we have consumed some information), then this seems to be a rea-
sonable outcome. We can therefore attribute a cost, in terms of information, to exploratory analysis: if
we are really interested in inference, we should not squander information unnecessarily. Viewing loss of
information as a cost is one that is certainly recognizable today: large scale internet companies owe at
least part of their financial success due to their skills in acquiring data from their many users. Even more
clear is the cost of doing science. Without grant funding, scientists would have much less data.
1.2. Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the role of conditioning in selective
inference. Section 3 discusses the role of a statistical model in selective inference. Section 4 combines
the previous two sections defining a DAG-DAG, the basic object used for constructing relevant refer-
ence distributions. Section 5 considers randomized selection algorithms with Section 5.2 describing how
particular randomized versions of selective inference allow for explicit descriptions of the appropriate ref-
erence distribution. Bayesian inference after selection is described in Section 6, where the data scientist
may choose the model, including the prior, after some initial exploration. In Section 7, we carry out a
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randomized version of data scientist U ’s analysis above, writing out the explicit reference distribution.
Some computational and theoretical details are given in Appendix A through an example of inference for
a prototypical simple problem: inference after thresholding a sample mean.
2. The role of conditioning
A reader new to the literature on selective inference may ask themselves why we should condition on the
results of queries about the data. The short answer is that we recognize that humans are easily biased
by data [Simmons et al., 2011, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974], while statistical methods strive to provide
unbiased conclusions. Conditioning on what we have observed about the data, combined with traditional
methods of mathematical statistics allows us to provide unbiased conclusions even after we have observed
some functions of the data.
As illustration, we begin with perhaps the simplest statistical inference problem: testing a point null
hypothesis. To isolate the idea from any particular model, we describe the approach in a fictitious scientific
field foology (rhymes with zoology) in which scientists are searching for a conjectured to exist bar particle
in a system with many foo particles. If one prefers to think in more concrete terms, we might consider
ourselves an internet company where foo particles represent typical users and bar particles are big-
spenders. Alternatively, we might imagine ourselves a cyber-security company where foo particles are
normal users and bar particles are intruders.
Assume now that data T P T (in the form of a single particle) has been collected in some experiment.
Based on theoretical considerations in the field of foology, it is assumed that the law of S when the sample
is foo is known and denoted by F0. We call the statistical model H0 “ tF0u, the null hypothesis of foology.
The task of determining whether or not this sample is foo or bar is given to a data scientist, U . We
identify the data scientist as a random variable to acknowledge that different data scientists will analyze
data differently, though we do not consider this in our simple example.1
As this field of science is relatively new, no gold standard has emerged as the best test to distinguish
between foo and bar, though we assume that the data scientist has some collection pSiqiPI of test statistics
that have shown promise, with some having better power in different regions of T . At this point, U may
choose any one of the Si’s, which we denote by s
U
0 and carry out a hypothesis test by drawing replicates
pT¯bqBb“1 from F0 and comparing the empirical distribution of sU0 pT¯bq to the observed value of sU0 pT q.
Assuming, without loss of generality that the Si’s reject for large values, this produces a p-value (sending
B Ñ8)
p0pT q “ p0pT ; sU0 q “ F0
` 
t : sU0 ptq ě sU0 pT q
(˘
. (1)
Such a p-value is certainly recognizable to all statisticians.
Alternatively, to get some guidance regarding which test statistic to use, U might decide to query the
data. By query, we mean she might compute QU1 pT q, and, based on the observed value decide which of
1In fact, allow for users to be randomized algorithms running without human intervention. However, most of the time we
condition on U so treating it as random is somewhat moot. If we really understood the user, we might use this information.
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the Si’s to use.
2 In other words, our model of the interactive aspect of data analysis proceeds in silico as
a series of function evaluations where the functions take T as one of the arguments. The data scientist
observe q1, the return value of this function.
It is well documented that reporting a p-value such as (1) with, sU0 replaced by the Si chosen after
having observed QU1 pT q, is no longer appropriate as the test has been chosen based on the data. This is
similar to scenario # 3 in Gelman and Loken [2013]. It is also reminiscent of the discussion in Cox [1958],
in which a statistician is presented with a draw from one of two possible normal distributions with the
same means but different variance. In this setting, the statistician is also told which population the data
is drawn from. Cox compares a conditional test to an unconditional test and makes the point that if our
objective is to determine “what we can learn from the data that we have” then the conditional approach
is clearly the right approach. A key distinction between Cox’s example and our data scientist is that the
data scientist has decided to query the data to acquire this “additional” data, while in Cox’s example
the data scientist is simply told which population it was drawn from.
What is the analyst to report now? Having observed QU1 pT q to be q1, the distribution F0 is no longer an
appropriate reference distribution: the data analyst now knows that T is in the event
 
t : QU1 ptq “ q1
(
. A
natural solution to this problem is the conditional approach [Cox, 1958]: the data analyst can use whatever
test statistic she chooses, say, sU1 , as long as the reference distribution she uses is the restriction
3 of F0
to tt : QU1 ptq “ q1u. This results in a p-value
p1pT q “ p1pT ; sU1 , q1q “ F0
` 
t : sU1 ptq ě sU1 pT q
( ˇˇ
QU1 pT q “ q1
˘
. (2)
It is clear that under the null hypothesis of foology, i.e. that T is a foo particle, then such a p-value can
be used to provide a Type I error guarantee. For instance, assuming that sU1 has a density, then
F0 ptt : p1ptq ď αuq “ α. (3)
In fact, a stronger Type I error guarantee holds
F0
`tt : p1ptq ď αu |QU1 pT q “ q1˘ “ α.
We call this stronger Type I error guarantee a selective Type I error guarantee [Lee et al., 2016, Fithian
et al., 2014].
We can now summarize the philosophy of selective inference as:
Data scientists’ choice of what to report is easily biased by data snooping, invalidating most guarantees of
classical statistics. Conditioning on the data scientist’s observations allows data scientists to produce unbiased
statistical reports with similar (but selective) guarantees to reports produced by classical statistics if the
classical methods had been used properly.
2We use the subscript 1 in anticipation of allowing a second query below. Below, we will also allow the query to involve
possible additional randomization so we might write QU1 pT, ω1q where ω1 is drawn from some distribution known to U .
3A brief comment on notation and interpretation of the conditioning statements. When conditioning on the return value
of QU1 pT q being q1 we are really considering the restriction of F0 to this event. That is, we typically never construct the
corresponding conditional laws for any other values of q1. Hence, throughout, we are implicitly using regular conditional
probabilities always evaluated at observed quantities.
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While this seems a natural solution to the problem, what has this solution provided us, and what has
it cost us? At its core, a hypothesis test is a model-based attempt to quantify the uncertainty in T to
decide whether T is a bar particle or a foo particle. Having observed QU1 pT q “ q1 (because U requested
this function be evaluated) we have noted that the variation in T is modified – generally speaking it has
been diminished.
Conditioning on the value of QU1 returns the uncertainty to that determined by F0, in particular the
uncertainty of F0 restricted to the event tt : QU1 ptq “ q1u. As F0 is known, this conditioning can be carried
out exactly (in theory) and the data scientist can avoid any implicit bias he or she may have introduced
based on observing QU1 pT q is equal to q1. Hence, the ability to carry out “unbiased” frequentist inference
without querying the data (i.e. knowledge of F0) combined with conditioning on the result of the query
allows us to carry out “unbiased” frequentist inference after observing the result of the query. This seems
a substantial gain in that we recognize that data scientists rarely are ready to report a p-value without
some exploration of the data. While classical statisticians may want consumers of statistical methods
to not explore the data at all we recognize that this is generally not realistic. Our approach requires U
to declare the pair pQU1 , q1q. Of course, in order to make this approach practical, we also must be able
to construct the reference distribution in (2). Constructing this reference in more realistic data analysis
settings is considered in Section 5.2 below.
We see then, that using p-values that control selective Type I error allows us to use the data to select
which test statistic to use to test the null hypothesis of foology. Let us contrast our p-value (2) with what
we might call the naive p-value, which is referred to as “Researcher degrees of freedom without fishing”
in Gelman and Loken [2013]:
. . . computing a single test based on the data, but in an environment where a different test would have been
performed given different data; thus T py;φpyqq, where the function φp¨q is observed in the observed case.
This p-value is
pnaive1 pT q “ pnaive1 pT ; sU1 , qq “ F0
` 
t : sU1 ptq ě sU1 pT q;QU1 ptq “ q
(˘
. (4)
It should be clear that such a p-value does not provide any sort of selective Type I error guarantee. In
fact
pnaive1 pT q “ F0
` 
t : QU1 ptq “ q1
(˘ ¨ p1pT q
and hence
F0
`
pnaive1 pT q ď α |QU1 pT q “ q1
˘ “ α
F0
`tt : QU1 ptq “ q1u˘ .
The naive p-value can therefore be corrected here by dividing by an appropriate constant. We have
therefore effectively resolved this issue of “researcher degrees of freedom without fishing”. Our corrected
p-value is just p1 (2). We caution the reader that such a simple correction will not generally work. In more
complicated models naive p-values can similarly be defined though the relationship between a selective
p-value (i.e. a p-value with selective Type I error guarantees) and a naive one is not as simple as above.
We saw above that the selective Type I error guarantee is in fact stronger than a marginal Type I
error guarantee. As our p-value (2) provides control of this error, by the no-free lunch principle, there
must be some cost to using this p-value. This cost comes in terms of power and can be seen when we
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revisit the idea that QU1 provides the data scientist “additional” information. In (2) we see that Q
U
1 is
not really “additional” data – it is a function of T . When conditioning on the observed value of QU1 pT q,
the variation in T is diminished. This variation is of course the source of power of our statistical test, and
is why Cox [1958]’s unconditional test has higher marginal power than the conditional test. This loss of
power can be framed in terms of the conditional information of T |QU1 or the leftover Fisher information
[Fithian et al., 2014] in parametric models.
2.1. Do we have to worry about forking paths?
Above, our user U reported only p1pT q, having chosen test statistic sU1 after observing QU1 pT q “ q1. What
would the user have done if they had observed QU1 pT q “ q11? Gelman and Loken [2013] referred to this
problem as the garden of forking paths. What should we do to account for the possibility that QU1 pT q
might have been q11 instead of q1?
One reply to this question is given in Section 2.2 below, pointing out that the traditional exploratory
/ confirmatory model of data analysis never carry out such counterfactuals. Nevertheless, if we so desire,
there is nothing stopping us from going through such a counterfactual exercise, though answering the
question of what data scientist U might have chosen if the result had been q11 rather than q1 is clearly a
difficult problem.
Imagine then that U has decided before hand what test statistic she would use for every q in the range
of QU1 . That is, suppose our data scientist U describes a rule to choose a test statistic SQU1 : T ˆQU1 as
a function where QU1 is the range of QU1 . This rule may be randomized or not. In theory, one might then
construct a p-value, defined on all of T that provides a Type I error guarantee like (3) though the p-value
itself would of course be a different random variable. One way to form such a p-value is to simply report
the selective p-value for each possible outcome q1 P QU1 , though in many scenarios, each p-value controls
a different error rate making their comparisons slightly difficult even though they can be computed in
theory.
A second approach would be just to consider the marginal distribution of SQU1 pT,QU1 q under F0. In
both cases we require our data scientist to provide this map SQU1 which depends on the query they are
going to evaluate. Description of this mapping is referred to as pre-registering in Gelman and Loken
[2013]. It is also a required step in the simultaneous approach of Berk et al. [2013] in that they require
knowledge of QU1 in order to describe the class of functionals they seek to have simultaneous coverage
guarantees.
Arguably, data analysis is quite subjective and intuitive. Data scientists may not want to describe
such a map SQU1 . Indeed, it may be impossible for a user U to describe their intuition in such formal
terms. The conditional approach only considers what the data scientist observes about the data, defining
a p-value only on the selection event  
t : QU1 ptq “ q1
(
.
In this sense, if we take the conditional approach we can ignore the forking paths – we are only interested
in the value of queries for the “data that we have” as Cox might say.
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If we decide to adopt this conditional approach, then, we are effectively pruning down the trees in this
garden of forking paths. While we are not requiring U to describe all counterfactual data analyses she
might have done, we might be losing something. We have already acknowledged that we sacrifice some
power in this approach, though this is completely expected. We also are giving up on the possibility of
marginal guarantees. By this, we mean that without specifying a pre-registration map, there is no sensible
way to define a p-value on all of T . However, as we argue in the following section, viewed in the large
sense, the classical confirmatory / exploratory paradigm has exactly the same issue.
Readers may point out that we are requiring U to declare all of their exploration as part of the process
of reporting their p-value. Hence, we are requiring U to be honest. However, this is no different than the
simultaneous approach of Berk et al. [2013]: data analysts can certainly try many transforms of features
and covariates before forming a design matrix X. The use of pre-registration is a form of certification
of honesty, which comes with at least two costs. First of all, U must specify a map such as SQU1 . The
second cost is one we will discuss in Section 3 below when we discuss the role of statistical models in our
context. Using pre-registration, both U and the scientist are prevented from magical thinking in specifying
a new statistical model after having observed the results of QU1 . Exploratory data analysis is meant to
create tools that allows humans to extract insight from data – pre-registration excludes the abuse of such
information in specifying a statistical model, and hence in producing reports about parameters that only
became interesting after some exploration of the data.
2.2. The exploratory and confirmatory theory of data analysis
Tukey argues that science invariably requires both exploratory data analysis: allowing U to query the data
and observe the results; as well as confirmatory data analysis: reporting p-values and confidence intervals
[Tukey, 1980, 1991]. Of course, statisticians recognize the problems inherent in testing hypotheses using
the same data used to generate them. How then, can these conflicting goals be resolved?
The simplest approach is to collect more data to evaluate the hypotheses generated in an exploratory
phase. This is the classical exploratory / confirmatory theory of data analysis.
Let us suppose then that U reports to the scientist collecting the data that test statistic sU1 seems like
a promising test statistic based on their exploratory data analysis, i.e. the evaluation of QU1 on T . The
scientist runs a second experiment in identical conditions to collect T 1. As luck would have it, the science
of foology happens to tell us that T 1 independent of T and identically distributed. Hence, its distribution
under the null of foology is F0. The data scientist then computes
p11pT 1q “ F0
` 
t1 : sU1 pt1q ě sU1 pT 1q
(˘
. (5)
If the p-value is less than 0.05 – they have discovered a bar particle! (at level 0.05).
Such a p-value is surely uncontroversial: as uncontroversial as any p-value or hypothesis test may
ever be. We also did not require U to specify a map SQU1 . However, let us consider the totality of the
uncertainty in this setting. In this setting, the data we have sampled is pT, T 1q „ F ˆ F with the null
hypothesis of foology expressed simply as H0 : F “ F0. A little thought shows that p11 is actually only
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well-defined on  pt, t1q : QU1 ptq “ q1( .
We say well-defined in the sense that the model used to construct a reference distribution here never
considers the possibility that QU1 pT q ‰ q1. Even this uncontroversial exploratory analysis followed by
confirmatory analysis does not consider all the possible answers to the query evaluated on T . In this
sense, classical statistics never considers all of the counterfactual forking paths of Gelman and Loken
[2013].
A little more thought shows that our confirmatory p-value can be expressed in terms of the law
LF0ˆF0
`
T 1
ˇˇ
T,QU1 pT q “ q1
˘ ” LF0ˆF0 `T 1 | T ˘ .
In the conditional approach we require only conditioning on the observed values of the queries, so it is
reasonable to construct a selective p-value testing the null hypothesis of foology using the law
LF0ˆF0
`pT 1, T q |QU1 pT q “ q1˘ . (6)
In fact, tests constructed based on the law (6) can have significantly greater power than (5). This increase
in power is demonstrated numerically in Fithian et al. [2014] in a parallel data analysis paradigm: data
splitting (c.f. [Cox, 1975, Hurvich and Tsai, 1990]) in which an exploratory and confirmatory sample are
produced from one larger sample.
3. The role of the statistical model: Eureka!
Up to this point, our discussion in the field of foology has focused on detecting departures from the
null hypothesis of foology described by F0. For scientists following the scientific method, the statistical
model H0 “ tF0u should be thought of as a mathematical model of the current understanding of foology.
Nothing in the scientific method says that this model is the one model to rule them all. Indeed, one of
the great things about science is that data can, and in some cases should, force scientists to change their
model. In this section, we discuss how inferactive data analysis addresses this issue.
For concreteness, suppose that based on U ’s query, B experiences a moment of magical thinking.
Having observed QU1 pT q, B posits a new distribution FE (E for Eureka!) as a possible competing model
to F0. Using new data T
1, B asks U to compute a new goodness-of-fit p-value
FE
` 
t1 : sU1 pt1q ě sU1 pT 1q
(˘
(7)
though they are not restricted to the statistic sU1 . Of course, in this test, B’s goal is not to reject a null
hypothesis as rejecting this null hypothesis would tend to falsify the new model.
Some in the foology community are skeptical of B’s model. How are they to decide? Assuming the two
distributions F0, FE have density with respect to a common measure, the natural construction uses the
likelihood ratio by appealing to Neyman-Pearson. Using this, B and the rest of the community can agree
on a way to decide whether T 1 has sufficient evidence to falsify F0 and conclude that B has made a step
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forward in foology. This p-value would be
pclassical “ F0
ˆ"
t1 :
fEpt1q
f0pt1q ď
fEpT 1q
f0pT 1q
*˙
. (8)
Above, the terms fE , f0 are densities for T
1 with respect to some common carrier measure.
In constructing the above p-value, the scientists have essentially forgotten about the original data T .
In computing the p-value (7), B is asserting that the law of T 1 is FE under the new model. If B’s new
theory can posit a joint distribution for pT, T 1q then a selective p-value using a construction similar to
(6). As experimental consideration under the null hypothesis of foology indicated that pT, T 1q are IID,
it seems possible that the same holds under B’s new theory as well, though this is not necessary for
the construction of the selective p-value. Assuming existence of appropriate densities, Neyman-Pearson
indicates that the optimal test has the form
pcarve “
pF0 ˆ F0q
´!
pt, t1q : fEpt,t1qf0pt,t1q ď fEpT,T
1q
f0pT,T 1q , Q
U
1 ptq “ q1
)¯
pF0 ˆ F0q
` pt, t1q : QU1 ptq “ q1(˘ . (9)
(With some abuse of notation, we have used the same notation for the density of pT, T 1q as the marginal
density of T or T 1 above.)
In fact, B need not even collect more data in order to construct a test with the same Type I error
guarantees as (8, 9). Using just T , U can report the p-value (2) and enjoy the same guarantees as the
two p-values above.
pselect “
F0
´!
t : fEptqf0ptq ď fEpT qf0pT q , QU1 ptq “ q1
)¯
F0
` 
t : QU1 ptq “ q1
(˘ . (10)
The three p-values can be used to test exactly the same hypothesis comparing F0 to B’s new theory
FE . Thresholding each of the three p-value at α results in a test that controls selective Type I error. We
note that, (9) and (8) require the additional cost and time of collecting data T 1.
In terms of power, Theorem 9 of Fithian et al. [2014] demonstrates that in the context of data split-
ting (9) dominates (8) in quite general settings. In our case, while T and T 1 were collected in different
experiments, the sampling distribution of pT, T 1q is equivalent to one in which both are collected contem-
poraneously and we use one sample to choose which test statistic to use. We expect that (9) dominates
the other two while (8) dominates (10).
The test based on p-value (9) or (10) violates the classical separation between confirmatory and
exploratory data analysis as B only posited the model FE after U had reported the results of query Q
U
1 .
As in the simple point null case, conditioning on what U has observed permits U to construct statistical
reports that are unbiased in the sense that the tests all enjoy control of the selective Type I error.
3.1. Selective model
Our example above considers a model tF0, FEu. In more realistic examples, our statistical models are
typically more complex. Consider then a parametric model for the law of pT, T 1q:
M “ tFθ : θ P Θu
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containing H0. Clearly, up to computational considerations, it is simple to construct the Neyman-Pearson
test of H0 versus HA : F “ Fθ for any θ P Θ. All of the usual theory of parametric statistical models can
be applied to the selective model
Mq˚1 “
!
F˚θ|q1 : θ P Θ
)
, (11)
where
F˚θ|q1pAq “ Fθ
`
A |Q1U pT q “ q1
˘
is the restriction of some Fθ PM to the selection event.
The model Mq˚1 is still a parametric model. Hence, any tools available to us for parametric models
are applicable in this selective inference setting as well. As in our simple example of testing the null
hypothesis of foology, understanding ofM can be combined with conditioning on what we have observed
about T after QU1 in order to construct selectively valid inference, i.e. “unbiased” inference after selection.
Of course, the construction of a selective model does not depend on M being parametric as one can
simply restrict each distribution in some collection to the same event. Under appropriate conditions,
notions such as consistency and weak convergence along sequences of models transfer to corresponding
sequences of selective models. See Fithian et al. [2014], Markovic and Taylor [2016], Tian and Taylor
[2015a], Tibshirani et al. [2015] for more complete descriptions of what structure ofM transfers toMq˚1 .
4. Putting the pieces together: the DAG-DAG
As the data is random, the results of functions evaluated (i.e. the queries) on the data are also random,
hence any distribution we posit for the data T (such as F0 or FE) induces a joint distribution for
pT, T 1, QU1 q. The random variables in this joint distribution are not independent – QU1 is a function of
T . This dependence can be expressed in terms of a dependency graph G as in Figure 1 a). Viewing
the nodes of this DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) as random variables, we see that having specified a
joint distribution for the data pT, T 1q, the data scientist understands completely the joint distribution
of pT, T 1, QU1 q. Specifying a statistical model M for pT, T 1q (i.e. a collection of distributions) in turn
specifies a statistical model for pT, T 1, QU1 q, the nodes in the dependency graph G. This induced model is
determined by M and the function QU1 : T Ñ Q1. In terms of the dependency graph, we see then that
the model is determined by a joint distribution for all observed data as well as specification of the query
functions which are represented by the edges in the dependency graph. Let us call this induced model
M1 “M1pM, QU1 q.
As described in Section 2, in order to not bias herself in her conclusions, the data scientist conditions
on the value of QU1 . This can be expressed as restricting each law in M1 to the selection event, yielding
a selective model M˚ “ M˚pM, QU1 q as in (11). Each distribution in M˚ has the same dependency
structure (i.e. DAG) as the dependency graph in Figure 1 determined by QU1 (which is encoded by
the edge in the dependency graph) and the assumption of independence of T and T 1. This new model
M˚ represents the data scientists model of how pT, T 1, QU1 q are generated, conditional on what she has
observed about the data. The null hypothesis of foology can be identified with one point inM˚, and B’s
Eureka model can be identified with another.
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a)
T
QU1
T ′
b)
T
QU1
T ′
c)
T
QU1
T ′
Fig 1: a) The dependency graph for pT, T 1, QU1 q in our foology example. Both the confirmatory (8) and
carved p-values (9) have the same dependency graph. b) The DAG-DAG for the confirmatory p-value
(8). The data analyst posits a model for pT, T 1q, specifying a model for pT, T 1, QU1 q and conditions on the
values of pT,QU1 q (or, equivalently simply T ). c) The DAG-DAG for the selective p-value (9). The data
analyst posits a model for pT, T 1q, specifying a model for pT, T 1, QU1 q and conditions on the values of QU1 .
We call such statistical models DAG-DAGs: Data Analysis Generative DAGs. They are specified by a
dependency graph G with vertices of two types: data nodes and query nodes. Along with G, the results
of the queries are memorized as Q and a statistical modelM is posited for the data nodes. A DAG-DAG
then, is specified by the tuple pG,Q,Mq. The pair pG,Qq is fully observed: it represents the queries the
data analyst makes about the data and their observed values. The statistical model M is specified by U
in order to carry out statistical inference about distributions inM. The choice ofM is allowed to depend
on pG,Qq. DAG-DAGs are the basic building blocks in describing inferactive data analysis and are such
that, up to sampling, they describe exactly how to reconstruct the p-value (9). Figure 1 b) describes this
sampling distribution: the blue nodes indicate random variables for which the user must posit a joint
distribution (coming from M) while yellow nodes indicate random variables whose observed values the
data scientist conditions on (the values are stored in Q). Statistical model and observed query results are
integrated together through the dependency graph G.
While control of the selective type I error requires the data scientist to condition on which queries
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they have observed, the data scientist may also condition on more (typically) at the cost of lower power
Fithian et al. [2014]. Figure 1 c) illustrates the sampling distribution used to construct (8), constructed
by conditioning on the first experiment’s data T . Other reasons to condition on some of the data nodes in
a DAG-DAG might be computational (c.f. Lee et al. [2016]) or related to other more classical statistical
issues in conditional inference.
In order to provide valid selective inference, we will require the data scientist to make note of the
result of each query. The data scientist may request B to collect additional data as the process evolves. In
order to provide valid selective inference, U must specify a statistical model for the joint distribution of
any nodes in the DAG-DAG that are not observed. One might say that the data itself is “observed” and
perhaps we should condition on it. However, if we condition on the data itself, the resulting distributions
in Figure 1 would all be degenerate, hence generating replicates from these distributions would have no
information about our null hypothesis. Further, with the complexity of modern data sets, it seems fair to
say that we never really observe all of our data. Rather, we typically observe functions (often summary
statistics) of the data.
In particular, if each query takes on only countable many values, it is clear that the appropriate law
at time i is the selective distribution F0˚,i, i ě 1 defined by the selective likelihood ratio [Tian and Taylor,
2015a]
dF0˚,i
dF0,i
ptiq 9
iź
j“1
1tQFj p¨q“qUj upt
iq def“ WpGi,Qiqptiq (12)
where qUj are the observed results of the query. In the above likelihood ratio, the distribution F0,i is the
statistical model specified by the analyst while the right hand side can be read directly off the dependency
graph Gi and observed query values Qi up to stage i. For a candidate F0,i for the law of T
i, the actual
selective likelihood ratio is just the normalized WGi :
dF0˚,i
dF0,i
ptiq “ WpGi,Qiqpt
iq
EF0,irWpGi,Qiqptiqs
(13)
Note also that the right hand side depends only on observable quantities. Hence, (12) defines a recipe to
construct a selective model from the dependency graph and a model for T i. For instance, after B’s Eureka
moment, if U can posit a generative model FE˚,i for data collected up to query i, then she can construct
the selective distribution FE˚,i which has a density (with respect to FE,i) proportional to (12). More
generally, given any statistical model for T i, we can construct a selective model from this dependency
graph and the result of the queries up to time i using the right hand side (12).
4.1. Updating a DAG-DAG
Having allowed a data scientist one query, of course they will want to evaluate a second query, based on
what they have observed the value (i.e. QU1 ). Further, one data set does not typically exist in a vacuum:
labs will want to collect more data based on the outcomes of earlier queries (including selective hypothesis
tests). If our framework is to be useful, it should behave nicely under such operations.
In constructing (9) we supposed that B had commissioned collecting a second data set T 1 in an effort
to decide whether FE is a true breakthrough in the field of foology. In terms of the dependency graph,
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QU1 is still a function only of T , and we simply add an additional node for T
1. Specifying the DAG-DAG
simply requires a joint distribution for the pair pT, T 1q which we have taken to be IID F0 under the null
hypothesis of foology. Figure 2 a) and b) illustrate the dependency graph the DAG-DAG in which the
data scientist queries T again, yielding QU2 pT,QU1 q.
Of course, as B has commissioned T 1 to be collected, U might decide to evaluate a query Q¯U2 pT, T 1, QU1 q.
This would result in the dependency graph and DAG-DAG in Figure 2 c) and d), respectively. Having
observed QU1 and Q
U
2 , the data scientist chooses a test statistic and reports
p2pT, T 1q “ p2pT, T 1; s2, rq1, q2sq “ pF0ˆF0q
` pt, t1q : sU2 pt, t1q ě sU2 pT, T 1q ˇˇQU1 ptq “ q1, QU2 pq1, tq “ q2(˘ .
(14)
Using query Q¯U2 , an appropriate p-value might be
p¯2pT, T 1q “ p¯2pT, T 1; s2, rq1, q2sq “ pF0ˆF0q
` pt, t1q : sU2 pt, t1q ě sU2 pT, T 1q ˇˇQU1 ptq “ q1, Q¯U2 pt, t1, q1q “ q2(˘ .
(15)
Clearly, this process could continue indefinitely, collecting more data and recording the result of U ’s
queries. Formally, then, we can think of this record of a data analysis in a computer age version of the
scientist’s notebook in which a data scientist records their observations at relevant steps of the data
analysis.
Consider the expressions (1, 2, 14): these are three different p-values for testing the null hypothesis
of foology. The first two use only the data T while (14) uses pT, T 1q. In what sense are these p-values,
or hypothesis tests based on thresholding them valid? Let F denote the unknown true data generating
mechanism for T . Clearly, thresholding p0 at level α produces a valid test of H0 : F “ F0. It is also
relatively simple to see that similarly thresholding p1 and p2 at level α also result in valid tests of the
above hypothesis. However, more is true. By construction, thresholding p1 or p2 at level α produces
a hypothesis test that is selectively valid [Fithian et al., 2014] at stages 1 and 2 of the data analysis,
respectively.
By this we mean that at any stage i in the data analysis, U is able to produce a dependency graph Gi
describing all data collected up to this stage as well as all function evaluations on this data. (Such practice
is already encouraged in order to ensure in silico reproducibility of results, though such notebooks are
not typically used for inference.) Data scientist U , employed by B, may then report selective (for instance
Neyman-Pearson) tests at any stage i based on the graph Gi and observed query values based on the
law of their favorite test statistic (determined by FE if we use a Neyman-Pearson test) under the null
hypothesis of foology.
We might denote the i-th query by QFi´1 as it is measurable with respect to Fi´1 and the data collected
up to the i-th time point as T i. We denote the i-th test statistic by sFi as its selection is measurable with
respect to Fi. A natural choice for i-th p-value is just the usual one-sided p-value with observed value
sFipT iq and reference distribution based on the law
sFi,EpT¯ iq | Fi, T¯ i „ F0,i, (16)
where F0,i is the law of T¯
i under the null hypothesis of foology.
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Fig 2: a) The dependency graph for pT,QU1 , QU2 q after U has evaluated two queries on the data: QU2 is
a function only of pT,QU1 q. b) The DAG-DAG used to compute the p-value p2 (14). c) The dependency
graph for pT,QU1 , Q¯U2 q after U has evaluated two queries on the data: Q¯U2 is a function of pT, T 1, QU1 q. d)
The DAG-DAG used to compute the p-value p¯2 (15).
In this simple example, the statistical model used by U is the two-point model tF0, FEu for each stage
i of the data analysis. In this sense, we can make sense of both null and alternative hypotheses valid at
each stage of the data analysis and U can report a meaningful comparison of these two hypotheses at
any stage.
In more complex data analyses, it is likely that the model itself will change with i. For example, in our
3TC example, after marginal screening, U might decide a reasonable model might include only variables
that survive our thresholding rules, while U might change the statistical model if important interactions
are discovered in the second stage or if several variables are dropped in the LASSO analysis. Nevertheless,
U can produce p-values after only marginal screening or after the second LASSO analysis. In what sense
are these valid?
The short answer is that the p-values at the i-th stage are selectively valid given Fi. In our foology
example, B may refine the law FE , allowing it to depend on stage i of the data analysis. Alternatively,
the field may have decided independently of B that F0 has been falsified after U has evaluated Q
U
1 but
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before producing p2. The field of foology may have then replaced F0 with F¯0 a refined null hypothesis of
foology. In this case, the appropriate reference distribution for p2 in the two-point model would seem to
be
L `s2pT¯ 2q ˇˇ F2˘ , T¯ 2 “ pT, T 1q „ F¯0 ˆ F¯0. (17)
In this case, p-values pp0, p1q are selectively valid under F0 while p2 is valid under F¯0. Such a situation
is unavoidable if a field of science is to refine its statistical model based on empirical data. The p-
values pp0, p1q were indeed valid under the community’s understanding of foology at the time they were
computed.
In a setting where the dependency graph evolves as the field analyses data and collects more data, a
reasonable requirement of selective p-values are that they are always-valid [Johari et al., 2015]. That is,
F0,i
`
pi ď α
ˇˇ Fi˘ ď α. (18)
However, even under F0, the joint distribution of pp0, p1, p2q may be quite complex. For certain sequential
model building data analysis schemes, the joint distribution of such selective p-values can be described
somewhat concretely [Fithian et al., 2015].
4.1.1. Merging DAG-DAGs
It is certainly possible that more than one data scientist will analyze it. Perhaps they want to work
together on a joint analysis? Can we resolve their two DAG-DAGs? Let G be the dependency graph of U
and G1 the dependency graph of U 1. These graphs certainly share some nodes: the data nodes. They may
also share other nodes: suppose both U and U 1 use the same first query – then (absent randomization
introduced below) both will have the node following data node T 1. Allowing U and U 1 both access to
T i at each stage i is analogous to broadcasting T i on a network where U and U 1 are different machines.
Complete cooperation between U and U 1 then corresponds to broadcasting all queries and observed values
of the same network.
More interesting questions certainly arise: what if U is willing only to share part of their DAG-DAG
with U 1? What information must U transmit to U 1 to achieve this? What information must U retain?
Such questions are certainly interesting, though we leave these to further work.
5. The role of randomization: experiments in data science
We have described how a data scientist can query a data set multiple times before producing selectively
valid p-values.4 However, in the absence of collecting new data, each query by the data scientist shrinks
the support of the relevant conditional distribution and it is not hard to imagine an inexperienced data
scientist querying the data so much that the conditional law begins to collapse towards a point mass. In
4We have not yet explicitly described how to construct confidence intervals. These can of course be constructed by
inverting selectively valid hypothesis tests. See Fithian et al. [2014], Tian and Taylor [2015a], Markovic and Taylor [2016],
Tibshirani et al. [2015] for further details.
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this case, the relevant hypothesis test will suffer a reduction in power to find bar particles. In the selective
inference framework, this phenomenon has been referred to as the “leftover information” as measured by
Fisher information in parametric selective models.
In the differential privacy literature [Dwork et al., 2015] and selective inference literature [Tian and
Taylor, 2015a], a device that has been used to minimize the information loss after each query is random-
ization. In this setting, instead of computing QU1 pT q and QU2 pT q the data scientist computes a randomized
version of these queries. That is, for the first query the data scientist specifies a collection pKU1 ptqqtPT of
probability distributions on sample space Ω1 and makes a single draw Q
U
1 „ KU1 pT q. Based on the value
of qU1 , the data analyst specifies a new family of probability distributions pKpU,rq1sq2 ptqqtPT and makes a
single draw Q
pU,rqU1 sq
2 „ KpU,rq
U
1 sq
2 pT q.
Simple examples of additional randomness include evaluating functions on subsampled data, i.e. data
splitting methods [Hurvich and Tsai, 1990, Wasserman and Roeder, 2009]. The area of adaptive data
analysis (c.f. Dwork et al. [2015]) in computer science builds on randomization methods of differential
privacy to provide some statistical guarantees in this interactive setting.
The results of the queries here are random beyond the randomness in the data T or pT, T 1q. In this
sense, evaluation of the queries can be thought of as experiments designed by U to learn something about
the data. This can be a sticking point for many statisticians, as the results of the data analysis depend
somewhat on the random seed used to draw the queries. While we acknowledge this, we point out that
the results of the data analysis were already random to begin with: the data itself is random. Further,
in a practical setting, U ’s choice of queries (even if no additional randomness is inserted) is somewhat
random and subject to U ’s train of thought during the data analysis. These arguments will surely not
convince every statistician of the usefulness of randomization. We present some more concrete advantages
to randomization below: namely an increase in selective power, and, in many cases, a tractable selective
model.
In practical terms at the inference stage, the main difference is that the selective likelihood ratio has
been replaced by a (typically) smoother function. Denote the kernel at the i-th time point as KFipt, ¨q
the selective likelihood ratio (12) is replaced by
dF0˚,i
dF0,i
ptiq 9
iź
j“1
KFj pqUj ; tjq. (19)
Computation of this likelihood ratio is generally impossible analytically, hence Monte Carlo methods are
generally, though not always, necessary. Tian et al. [2016], discussed below, presents some examples of
randomization in which the Monte Carlo burden can be substantially decreased, if not removed completely.
A common special case of the above setup is when the data scientist, based on observed information
up to Fi draws ωi from some distribution Gi conditional on T i and the information up to Fi. The data
scientist then observes QFj “ hFj pωjq, in which case
KFj pqUj ; tjq “ Gj
` 
ωj : h
Fj pωjq “ qUj
( ˇˇ
tj
˘
.
At any stage i, the joint distribution F¯0,i of pT¯ i, ω1, . . . , ωiq (conditional on U) can be expressed in a
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simple form under F0,i via the likelihood ratio
dF0˚,i
dF0,i
ptiq 9 F¯0,i
` pti, ω1, . . . , ωiq : hFj pωjq “ qUj , 1 ď j ď i(˘
“
iź
j“1
Gj
` 
ωj : h
Fj pωjq “ qUj
( ˇˇ
tj
˘
.
(20)
The above form for the likelihood ratio means that draws from F0˚,i can be achieved by sampling from
the appropriate marginal of F0,i restricted to the event appearing on the right hand side.
For such randomized queries, in terms of the DAG-DAG only the functional form of arrows change.
From deterministic functions of T , they are now generated from kernels specified by U .
5.1. Why randomize? Power and consistency
The reader may be wondering why U want to randomize our query? Will we not decrease the chances of
a Eureka! moment? While this certainly seems true, there is a tradeoff involved. It has been empirically
noted and demonstrated theoretically in Fithian et al. [2014], Tian and Taylor [2015a], Markovic and
Taylor [2016] that randomized selective inference procedures often enjoy benefits that unrandomized
procedures do not have.
For example, under some sequences of selection procedures, it can be demonstrated that randomized
algorithms remain consistent for much larger classes of distributions than unrandomized procedures. For
instance, in the context of consistency and weak convergence, the case of a single query was studied
in detail in Tian and Taylor [2015a], including conditions for consistency and a central limit theorem
when considering sequences of DAG-DAGs such that the randomization also depends on some sample
size n. The regression examples presented in Fithian et al. [2014], Tian and Taylor [2015a] also clearly
demonstrate an increase in selective power after even a small amount of randomization.
5.2. Why randomize? The selective sampler
We have seen above that our target of inference can be expressed as a conditional distribution deter-
mined by a dependency graph G and a statistical model for the relevant data in G. Sampling from such
conditional distributions is generally recognized to be a difficult problem. Perhaps we might be saved by
special structure in our problems. For instance, Lee et al. [2016], Loftus and Taylor [2014], Lee and Taylor
[2014] have shown that many common model selection procedures such as LASSO, forward stepwise and
marginal screening have the selection event tQU1 ptq “ q1u expressed as explicit, if somewhat complicated,
polytopes. Fithian et al. [2014] points out in the exponential family setting we further condition on the
sufficient statistics of nuisance parameters to get an Uniformly Most Powerful Unbiased (UMPU) test.
With randomization we need to evaluate the kernel KFipt, ¨q in the selective likelihood ratio in (19). All
these factors contribute to the difficulty of direct computation of the selective p-values.
However, for many common queries, it turns out that the distributions in the DAG-DAG can be
reparametrized in a fashion that permits explicit representation of relevant selective likelihood ratios in
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terms of the data T and certain auxiliary variables related to the query. This is the subject of Tian et al.
[2016], which we summarize here.
Consider a general randomized convex statistical program
βˆpT, ωq “ argmin
βPIRp
`pβ;T q ` Ppβq ´ xω, βy ` 
2
}β}22, (21)
where ` is some smooth loss involving the data, P is some structure inducing convex function,5  ą 0 is
small that is sometimes necessary to assure the program has a solution and ω „ G is a randomization
chosen by the data analyst. Our query is represented as some function related to the solution to (21), for
instance the sparsity pattern
QU1 pT, ωq “
!
pj, signpβˆpT, ωqjq : βˆpT, ωqj ‰ 0
)
(22)
if our penalty is a sparsity inducing penalty such as the `1 penalty in the LASSO [Tibshirani, 1996b].
Our goal is to sample
pT, ωq |QU1 pT, ωq “ q1.
Marginalizing over ω yields the desired selective distribution (20).
Of course, it is well known that the event (22) can be expressed in terms of the KKT conditions of
(21). Inspection of the KKT conditions or subgradient equation of (21) yields the reconstruction map
ω “ φpβ, α, zq “ αˆps, ωq ` zˆpt, ωq `  ¨ βˆpt, ωq
defined on domain
tpβ, α, zq P Bq1ptq : α` z `  ¨ β P supppGqu,
where Bq1ptq is defined by the selection event. In the case of the LASSO with parameter λ in which we
write q1 “ pE, sEq in terms of variables and signs
Bq1ptq “ tpβ, α, zq : β´E “ 0, signpβEq “ sE , }z´E}8 ď λu
which does not even depend on t, though for other programs it may.
The subgradient equation gives rise to a canonical map
ψ : pt, ωq Ñ pt, β, α, zq (23)
which yields a change-of-variable formula to sample the augmented parameter space pt, β, α, zq instead of
the original pt, ωq. The advantage is that Bptq usually has simple constraints on the optimization variables,
e.g. quadrant for β and box for z, that are easy to sample from instead of the complicated constraints on
the original problem. Further, choosing G to have a Lebesgue density supported on all of IRp typically
ensures the support is simple.
We can now state the main theorem from Tian et al. [2016].
5The two most common examples of interest in statistical learning are Ppβq “ hKpβq “ supνPK νT β for some convex
K Q 0, i.e. a seminorm, and that Ppβq “ IKpβq “
$’&’%0 β P K8 β R K , where K is some cone or of the form tb : }b} ď 1u for some
seminorm } ¨ }. They address most of the statistical programs we are interested in.
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Theorem 1 (Selective sampler). The selective law
LFˆGppT, ωq | βˆpT, ωq P Aq “ L ppT,  ¨ β ` α` zq | pβ, α, zq P BpT qq
for suitable BpT q. With f denoting the density of T and gp¨|tq denoting the density of ω given t, the
random vector pT, β, α, zq has density proportional to
fptq ¨ gp ¨ β `α` z|tq ¨ |Jψpt, β, α, zq| ¨ 1Bptqpβ, α, zq “ fptq ¨ gpφpβ, α, zq|tq ¨
ˇˇ
detpDpβ,α,zqφq
ˇˇ ¨ 1Bptqpβ, α, zq
with the Jacobian the derivative of the map ψ with respect to pβ, α, zq on the fiber over t
 pβ, α, zq : QU1 pt,  ¨ β ` α` zq “ q1( .
.
Tian et al. [2016] has abundant examples varying both the penalty as well as the loss function, including
the canonical LASSO, forward stepwise and stagewise algorithms, marginal screening and generalized
LASSO for the penalties, as well as squared-error, logistic and log-det for covariance matrix estimation
for loss functions.
We see then if each query is of this form, even if the objective at stage i depends on the queries at
stages previous to i, the selective density is proportional to
fiptiq ¨
˜
iź
j“1
gj pjβj ` αj ` zjq ¨ Jψj
`
tj , βj , αj , zj
˘¸
(24)
supported on
ğ
tiPsupppFiq
˜
iź
j“1
 pβj , αj , zjq P Bqj ptjq : βj P IRpj , αj P B`jpβj ; tjq, zj P BPjpβjq(
¸
with fi some point in a statistical model Mi provided by U for the data collected up to stage i. Note
that the variables for each convex query are conditionally independent given ti, hence can be sampled in
parallel. This reparametrization is illustrated in Figure 3 in which the appropriate reference distribution
samples optimization variables O1 “ pβ1, α1, z1q and O2 “ pβ2, α2, z2q according to (24). The DAG-DAG
on the left represents the sampling distribution when U evaluates the queries on T without collecting new
data. The DAG-DAG on the right contains green nodes which are marginalized over but do not require
U to posit a distribution as their distribution is determined by the law of T and the selective sampler
likelihood ratio (24).
5.3. A side benefit of randomization: counterfactual analyses
Clearly, at any stage i, any other data scientist U 1 can take U ’s dependency graph Gi and observed query
results and specify their own statistical model. This is already done in the exploratory / confirmatory
paradigm as well, and may often be requested in a peer-review process. In the context of the DAG-DAG,
this corresponds to simply changing the statistical model posited for each of the data nodes in Gi.
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a)
QU2
T
QU1
b)
O1
T
O2
c)
QU2
T
QU1
T ′
d)
O1
T ′T
O2
Fig 3: a) The DAG-DAG for computing a p-value after evaluating two queries on T . b) The selective
sampler reparametrization of a) using (24). c) The DAG-DAG for computing p-value (15). d) The selective
sampler reparametrization of c) using (24).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to have U answer the question “what query would you have chosen for
QU2 if the observed value of Q
U
1 were different?” If U were willing to pre-register such a randomized data
analysis, the pre-registration declaration effectively provides a mathematical answer to this question and
U 1 could draw the results of a second query having changed the result of query QU1 . Of course, U 1 will
have to declare how different or perhaps some specific value of q1. In effect, this allows U
1 to jump from
one of Gelman’s forking paths to another, though the exercise seems to lead down to a rabbit hole if the
parameter that U reports a p-value about depends heavily on the answers to the previous queries. This
rabbit hole is also avoided in the exploratory / confirmatory theory of data analysis because the field
typically considers the exploratory data as fixed, i.e. they have long since agreed to condition on it and
not vary it.
Whether or not U has preregistered their analysis, it is certainly possible to construct the reference
distribution for different observed values of the queries (i.e. fixing the functions that are evaluated and
changing their return values). This makes it possible for U 1 to evaluate evidence for or against other data
generating mechanisms knowing only Gi. It is also certainly possible for reviewers to take U ’s statistical
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model and investigate how sensitive inference is to the particular observed values of the queries. Such
counterfactual analyses are impossible without having randomized the query: for our observed T , either
QU1 pT q “ q1 or it does not.
6. The role of mathematical statistics
We comfortably divide ourselves into a celibate priesthood of statistical theorists, on the one hand, and a legion
of inveterate data analysts-sinners on the other. – Leamer [1978]
In this work, we have tried to describe a way that allows data scientists to explore their data to
discover interesting hypotheses. Conditioning on their path allows them to produce statistical reports
with selective guarantees. Formally, the statistical theorist has told the data scientist that the penance
for their sins is that they should use the selective model M˚ from their DAG-DAG for inference.
Having agreed that the proper reference distribution is found from the DAG-DAG, what role does the
mathematical statistician have? One prominent role is to further simplify the reference distributions in
the DAG-DAG. The selective sampler of Section 5.2 simplifies the conditional distributions of the DAG-
DAG by explicit potentials depending on the particular convex program solved (and which function of the
solution the data scientist has observed). The mathematical statistician can further simplify this when
the queries are such that asymptotic distribution theory can be applied.
6.1. Selective Central Limit Theorem
To this point, we have considered fairly two-point statistical models in foology without reference to any
asymptotic regime. While we have briefly defined parametric selective models, we have not gone into
much detail. More realistic data analyses parametric models or nonparametric models based on CLTs
along sequences of models are likely to be important. In this section, we describe some of the asymptotic
results found in Tian and Taylor [2015a], Markovic and Taylor [2016].
Suppose then that our data T “ Tn is such that, under statistical model Mn, the law of Tn is
asymptotically Gaussian. As our example below fits into this framework, for which we only observe one
data set (i.e. T ) we assume that we do not have access to T 1 though in practice we of course may have
such data. If the joint law of pTn, T 1nq were asymptotically Gaussian along the sequence of models Mn
then much of what follows extends naturally. The data scientist, based on observing the outcomes of
queries QU1 , Q
U
2 decides to report a selective hypothesis about a parameter θ “ θn : Mn Ñ R. In many
contexts, U will have access to an estimator θˆn of θn such that n
1{2pθˆn´θnpF qq is approximately centered
Gaussian with variance nVarF pθˆnq for all F PMn.
If pTn, θˆnq were jointly normal, then we can decompose Tn linearly as
Tn « γpF q ¨ θˆn `Nn (25)
where Nn (N for nuisance) is asymptotically independent of θˆn
Nn “ Tn ´ CovF pTn, θˆnq
VarF pθˆnq
¨ θˆn “ Tn ´ γpF q ¨ θˆn.
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a)
QU2
Nn
Tn
θˆn
QU1
b)
O1
Nn
Tn
θˆn
O2
c)
Nn
O1
θˆn
O2
Fig 4: a) Application of the selective CLT replacing data Tn with decomposition (25). (9) has the same
dependency graph. b) The selective sampler applied to a). c) As Tn is reconstructed directly from pθˆn, Nnq
the node Tn can effectively be removed, bearing in mind that it is reconstructed in silico.
When θpF q is multivariate, a similar decomposition holds with the reciprocal above replaced by matrix
inverse. We note that as long as θpF q is low-dimensional, we will often have reasonably good estimators
(i.e. consistent in an appropriate sense) of VarF pθˆnq underMn, for example using a pairs bootstrap when
Tn is formed from IID samples. Under certain conditions (c.f. Tian and Taylor [2015a]) such consistent
estimators remain consistent under selective models Mn˚.
How does the CLT along Mn transfer over to our inferactive setting? This is illustrated in Figure
4. Data T “ Tn can be replaced by pθˆn, Nnq in the dependency graph using the decomposition (25)
to reconstruct Tn from pθˆn, Nnq. The rest of the dependency graph remains the same. This results in
a new DAG-DAG given by Figure 4 a). As in the earlier case, the selective sampler can be used to
reparametrize this DAG-DAG yielding Figure 4 b). Further, as Tn is reconstructed directly from pθˆn, Nnq
it can be removed in the DAG-DAG yielding Figure 4 c).
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In this final DAG-DAG, U uses the Gaussian “plug-in” estimator from the original CLT along Mn.
More details, as well as a bootstrap version for the law of θˆn can be found in Tian and Taylor [2015a],
Markovic and Taylor [2016].
We have described a scenario here where θˆn and Nn are jointly Gaussian, though other schemes are also
possible. For instance, if Mn is a sequence of parametric models then Nn can be taken to be consistent
estimates of appropriate nuisance parameters with the decomposition (25) replaced by an appropriate
kernel.
6.2. Statistical representation
Above, in Section 6.1, we described how existing CLTs can be combined with a DAG-DAG in order to
produce a simpler DAG-DAG in which the statistical model is Gaussian. Our example only involved one
data node Tn with each query being expressed somehow as a function of Tn. In practice, each query may
be expressible as a function of a separate function of Tn. For instance, when Tn “ pXn, Ynq a design
matrix and response variable, we see that using the LASSO to select variables the query can be expressed
as a function of XTn Yn.
On the other hand, in the context of our HIV data, suppose U created a boxplot of Yn against a
set of mutations. The vertical demarcations of the barplot can be expressed in terms of the median and
quantiles of the fold change, stratified across each of these mutations. Such quantiles will typically be
subject to a CLT under reasonable conditions. However, the outliers in the boxplot cannot generally be
expressed in terms of quantities that satisfy a CLT as they are individual sample points.
Each query i then, can be expressed in terms of some random variable Zi measurable with respect
to the data nodes in the DAG-DAG, as well as the randomization that U added to the query. We call
the function Zi the statistical representation of that query. In silico, the result of a query has many
possible representations that a user might view: a set of non-zero coefficients may be reported as a list
or visualized in an image. This notion is made explicit in some computing systems, such as the jupyter
model of computation [Kluyver et al., 2016]. Our notion of a statistical representation associates a random
variable to the query in such a way that we might sample from its distribution under our chosen statistical
model. Many statistical representations are subject to CLT under reasonable (non-selective) statistical
models. When the joint distribution of such representations are asymptotically Gaussian, then there is
a clear way to carry out this program by applying the selective CLT to each query and conditioning on
the appropriate nuisance parameters for each node. Alternatively, one can use the selective bootstrap
[Markovic and Taylor, 2016] to implicitly carry out this decomposition.
Many model selection queries (LASSO, forward stepwise, marginal screening, and combinations thereof)
have asymptotically Gaussian statistical representations. An important class of queries, particularly to
practicing data scientists, would be graphical queries. Our boxplot example (minus the outlier ticks) is
one in which much of the statistical representation is subject to a CLT.
Scatterplots are clearly difficult to handle as any scatterplot with the response as one of the variables
“depends” on all of Y and hence one may have to condition on the entire response, leaving essentially
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no information for inference. Randomly perturbing the response is certainly possible. Alternatively, one
might try releasing pseudo scatterplots which fit a simple scatterplot smoother model to the data and
then report a sample from some parametric model to give U a random sketch of the scatterplot. It seems
an interesting question to determine what features of a scatterplot are actually used by data scientists
(and what their statistical representation might be), as well as whether or not such features actually help
the data scientist with their task of discovering interesting structures in and models for data. We leave
such questions for further research.
6.3. Selection adjusted Bayesian methods
After observing the results of queries QU1 and Q
U
2 , our data scientist U may have access to scientific
literature that might enable him to choose a parametric model for T along with a prior for its parameters.
How should the data scientist adjust inference appropriately?
For this, we follow the selection adjusted Bayesian methods of Yekutieli [2012] which were extended to
regression models (with an approximate posterior) in Panigrahi et al. [2016]. Formally, such methods use
the same dependency graph and observed queries as the frequentist methods though these dependency
graphs are prepended with the appropriate parameters (and possibly hyperparameters). The difference
is how a Bayesian data scientist arrives at a posterior. In the above works, the traditional likelihood that
U might use before observing the results of queries QU1 and Q
U
2 is replaced with a likelihood truncated to
the selection event. Of course, this is nothing more than the selective likelihood (13). Hence, given prior
pipθq the selection adjusted Bayesian methods have posterior
pipθ | T iq 9 WpGi,QiqpT
iq
E rWGi,QipT iq | θs ¨ pipθq.
The difficulty in using such methods is that the prior depends unavoidably on E
“
WGi,QipT iq | θ
‰
.
Approximations based on Chernoff-type bounds for such probabilities were proposed in Panigrahi et al.
[2016] to yield tractable Bayesian inference. The computational cost is still non-negligible: each step in an
MCMC algorithm requires an optimization to approximate this normalizing constant. Figure 5 illustrates
the construction of the selection adjusted Bayesian posterior.
7. 3TC data revisited
In this section, we return to the analysis of the 3TC data and construct the appropriate reference dis-
tribution based on U ’s data analysis. Let us start with the one-dimensional setting and move on later
to scenarios with covariates. We are given data y “ pY1, . . . , Ynq i.i.d„ F0 from some distribution F0 with
variance 1. The goal is to do valid inference for µ “ EY„F0rY s with y following the randomized selection
event
?
ny¯ ` ω ą τ,
where ω „ G is a random variable in R independent of y. Distribution G, with its density denoted as
g, and threshold τ are pre-specified and known. The above selection event corresponds to a randomized
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O1 O2
Fig 5: a) Selection adjusted Bayesian methods use the same dependency graph and observed queries with
prepended parameters θ. b) The selective sampler applied to a). c) For inference, the selection adjusted
Bayesian methods condition on the observed data T and marginalizes over everything else, returning the
appropriate posterior.
z-test. Without selection, we could use the asymptotic normality
?
npy¯ ´ µq dÑ N p0, 1q to do inference
for the mean. After the randomized selection above, we use the following test statistic
PRp?ny¯;?nµ, τq “ pPZ„N p?nµ,1q ˆ Pω„Gq
 
Z ă ?ny¯ | Z ` ω ą τ( . (26)
This test statistic is a pivotal quantity, i.e. it converges to a Unifr0, 1s random variable with respect to
the selective distribution of the data, hence it can be used to do valid selective inference. Furthermore,
the selective confidence interval for µ can be constructed by inverting the test PRp¨q. The computational
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and theoretical aspects of the pivot (26), including construction of the bootstrap version of the pivot, are
given in the appendix. Same techniques apply to regression with covariates as well.6
Now we follow the data analysis scenario in the introduction (Section 1.1). Our data pX, yq and the
working model is the pairs model that yi “ µpXiq ` i, i „ Np0, σ2q for i “ 1, . . . , n and the conditional
mean of y depends on X via the linear predictor βTX where β “ pβ1, . . . , βpq P Rp. The goal is to pick
the most significant βi’s and make valid inference on β.
Our selective sampler actually enables the selective inference for any convex statistical learning program
but suppose the data scientist decides to do a randomized marginal screening thresholded at c “ z1´α{2
for some nominal p-value threshold α on the HIV dataset. Specifically, it takes the T statistics with
randomization ω1 P Rp to compute
T˜j “ Tj ` ω1,j “ X
T
j y
σˆj ||Xj ||2 ` ω1,j
for each of the p centered variables Xj and selects the model E1 “ tj : |T˜j | ą cu. At this point the data
analyst simply reports E1. After we introduce the selective sampler in Section 7.1, we will derive valid
p-values for E1 and also for further multiple queries in Section 7.2.
7.1. Selective sampler after marginal screening
Following Section 1, the data analyst makes the first query QU1 ptq of thresholded marginal screening with
randomization which can be expressed in convex optimization form
minimize
η:}η}8ăc
1
2
}T ` ω1 ´ η}22, ω1 „ g1.
The reconstruction map becomes
φ1pT, η´E1 , oE1q “
¨˝
c ¨ sE1
η´E1
‚˛´ T `
¨˝
sE1 ¨ oE1
0
‚˛
with the selection event B1 conditioning on the set achieving the threshold c and their signs to be pE1, sE1q:
B1 “ tpT, η, oE1q : ηE1 “ c ¨ sE1 , }η´E1}8 ă c, oE1 ě 0u .
We thus sample pT, η´E1 , oE1q from a selective density proportional to
fpT q ¨ g1
¨˝¨˝
c ¨ sE1
η´E1
‚˛´ T `
¨˝
sE1 ¨ oE1
0
‚˛˛‚
and supported on B1, where f is the unselective law of T .
Setting c “ 2.5 selects 20 mutations and we plot the selective confidence intervals with the observed
values for these coefficients (Figure 7).
6Inference for the mean in this problem after nonrandomized selection event is also described in detail in the appendix.
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One step: confidence intervals and observed values
Observed
Fig 6: The plot shows the observed values (red), selective confidence intervals (blue) and selective p-values
after one view / query on the data.
7.2. Selective sampler after LASSO
Now the data analyst further fits a LASSO to examine the interactions of selected variables from marginal
screening, as proposed by the two-step procedures in Lee and Taylor [2014]. Specifically, with the selected
variables set E1 from the first query Q
U
1 ptq we define the (standardized) augmented design matrix Xaug
as E1 joined by all the nonzero interactions of them of size
ˆ|E1|
2
˙
. Then our second query QU2 ptq runs
LASSO on pXaug, yq and selects the support of βˆaug as E2 “ ti : βˆaugi ‰ 0u. The data analyst could thus
compute the selective p-value p2 after two queries pQU1 ptq, QU2 ptqq of the data.
QU2 ptq gives the second optimization problem as
minimize
βaugPIRp
1
2
}y ´Xaugβaug}22 ` 2}β
aug}22 ´ ωT2 βaug ` λ}βaug}1, ω2 „ g2.
The reconstruction map for ω2 is given by
φ2pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q “ 
¨˝
βaugE2
0
‚˛´Xaug,T py ´XaugE2 βaugE2 q ` λ
¨˝
sE2
u´E2
‚˛,
with the selection event B2 conditioning on the active set and their signs to be pE2, sE2q:
B2 “
 pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q : diagpsE2qβaugE2 ą 0, }u´E2}8 ď 1(
and the data-dependent Jacobian term Jψ2pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q “
ˇˇˇ
detpXaug,TE XaugE ` Iq
ˇˇˇ
. Therefore
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after K “ 2 steps, the selective density is proportional to
fEpXaug, yq ¨ g1 pφ1pT pX, yq, η´E1 , oE1qq ¨ g2
`
φ2pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q
˘ ¨ Jψ2pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q
supported on
 B1pT pX, yq, η´E1 , oE1q X B2pXaug, y, βaugE2 , u´E2q(. Here fE denotes the common choice of
the reference distribution f where the data analyst sets the support E “ E1 X E2.
Setting λ as the theoretical value from Negahban et al. [2012] selects another 12 interaction terms and
we plot the selective confidence intervals with the observed values for the coefficients.
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Two steps: confidence intervals and observed values
Observed
Fig 7: The plot shows the observed values (red), selective confidence intervals (blue) and selective p-values
after two views / queries on the data.
8. Discussion
We have provided a general framework for doing valid inference after making queries on the data and
making decisions on what inferential results to report based on the observed outcomes of the queries; we
call this “inferactive data analysis.” We also introduce a dependency graph, DAG-DAG, to describe the
relationship between data and queries. It consists of data and query nodes and can be updated after a
data analyst makes additional queries. DAG-DAG becomes very useful when we do selective inference for
the chosen parameters, where the conditional density we sample from can be directly obtained from the
corresponding graph.
To illustrate how statistical tools are applied in practice, we present various examples in this paper.
Among these tools, adding randomization to selection algorithms makes the inferential procedures more
/The philosophy of selective inference 32
powerful and computationally easier. This idea extends to a wide range of popular algorithms, includ-
ing LASSO, group LASSO, marginal screening, forward-stepwise and their combination into multiple
views/queries on the data. For more complicated regression problems, we describe the selection event in
terms of a data vector that is asymptotically multivariate Gaussian pre-selection. Theoretically, we can
show that the selective CLT and the implied linear decomposition guarantee valid selective inference for
the chosen parameters. As we do not use the whole dataset to describe the selection event, we reduce the
computational cost.
We illustrate the “inferactive” procedures through a real HIV dataset. We made two queries on it and
presented valid selective p-values and confidence intervals. All the implementations are online.7
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Appendix A: Simple problem
We present an overview of some important results in selective inference literature from the perspective
of the “simple problem.” In this problem, we are given data Y1, . . . , Yn „ Fn with mean EY„FnrY s “
µpFnq “ µn and variance EY„FnrpY ´ µnq2s “ σ2pFnq “ σ2n. We assume σ2n “ 1 in this section but this
can be relaxed with the consistent estimate of the variance. Note that Fn and µn can change with n. The
goal is to do inference for the mean µn after we selected the data vectors y “ pY1, . . . , Ynq for which either
nonrandomized or randomized version of the test-statistic
?
ny¯ is greater than a pre-specified threshold.
We present the definitions of selective pivots in this case and how they are computed. We further show the
constructed pivots are valid post-selection, i.e. using them for inference for µn ensures the (asymptotic)
control of selective type I error. These results translate to regression problems with more complicated
affine selection events.
Let us define the following notations.
• Fnn denotes the distribution of n IID samples from Fn.
• Fˆn denotes the empirical distribution of y and as above Fˆnn denotes the distribution of n IID samples
from Fˆn.
• Fn˚ denotes the joint distribution of the data vector y after selection, either randomized or nonrandom-
ized.
A.1. Simple example: nonrandomized selection event
A.1.1. Nonrandomized pivots: definitions and computations
The nonrandomized selection event is of the form
?
ny¯ ą τn,
for a given threshold τn. We show how to do inference for µn after our data y, originally generated from
Fnn , has been selected to satisfy the above inequality.
Before defining the selective pivots for µn, let us define two conditional CDFs.
• If the test statistic ?ny¯ was normal, i.e. from N p?nµn, 1q, then the conditional CDF of ?ny¯ would be
FNn pt;
?
nµn, τnq “ PZ„N p?nµn,1q tZ ă t | Z ą τnu
for all t P R.
• If the data was coming from its empirical distribution, then the conditional distribution of ?ny¯ would
be
FBn pt;
?
nµn, τnq “ Py‹„Fˆnn
 ?
npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ă t | ?npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ą τn
(
for all t P R, where the RHS is with respect to the bootstrap sample y‹ “ pY ‹1 , . . . , Y ‹n q „ Fˆnn .
The selective pivots for this problem are defined and computed as follows.
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(i) Plugin Gaussian pivot after nonrandomized selection or TG pivot is defined as
PN p?ny¯;?nµn, τnq “ FNn p
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq “ Φp
?
npy¯ ´ µnqq ´ Φpτn ´?nµnq
1´ Φpτn ´?nµq ,
where Φ denotes the CDF of a standard normal distribution. This pivot is a truncated Gaussian
(TG) test statistic introduced in Lee et al. [2016]. Since this pivot has an explicit form, computing
it is easy.
(ii) Bootstrap pivot after nonrandomized selection is defined as
PBp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq “ FBn p
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq
“ Fˆ
n
n t
?
npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ă ?npy¯ ´ µnqu ´ Fˆnn t
?
npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ă τn ´?nµnu
1´ Fˆnn t
?
npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ă τn ´?nµu
.
This pivot is introduced in Tibshirani et al. [2015]. To compute the bootstrap pivot above we sample
data with replacement to get the bootstrap samples pY ‹b1 , . . . , Y ‹bn q for b “ 1, . . . , B, where the size
B is large. We then compute the pivot as
1
B
řB
b“1 It?npy¯‹b´y¯qă?npy¯´µnqu ´ 1B
řB
b“1 It?npy¯‹b´y¯qăτn´?nµnu
1´ 1B
řB
b“1 It?npy¯‹b´y¯qăτn´?nµnu
.
Note that we can easily invert either of these pivots to get a confidence interval for µn by evaluate the
pivot over a grid of parameter values or use some of the root-finding functions.
A.1.2. Asymptotics of the nonrandomized pivots and honest coverage post-selection
We now state the results showing that under the post-selective distribution the pivots defined above have
asymptotically Unifr0, 1s distribution. We denote as Fn˚ the post-selective distribution of the data y „ Fnn
conditional on selection. Given tFn P Fn : n ě 1u as a sequence of distribution classes tFn : n ě 1u to
prove convergence results we state the following assumptions that we refer to separately.
(A) Convergence of the parameters: for every sequence of distributions tFn : Fn P Fn, n ě 1u there
exists µ such that
?
nµpFnq Ñ µ as nÑ8.
(B) Second moment assumption: for all Fn P Fn and all n ě 1, EX„FnrX2s “ 1.
(C) Third moment assumption: for all Fn P Fn and all n ě 1, EX„FnrX3s ă 8.
We will also need the following assumption about the selection regions.
(D) Convergence of the selection region: τn Ñ τ as nÑ8.
Lemma 1 (Nonrandomized selection: asymptotics of the plugin Gaussian pivot). Assuming tFn : n ě 1u
is a sequence of distributions for which (A) and (B) hold. Further assuming (D) holds, we have
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
tPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tPN p
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq ď tu ´ t
ˇˇ “ 0.8
Furthermore, if we define CIp?ny¯; τn, αq to be the set of µn such that α{2 ď Pp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq ď 1´α{2,
then CIN p?ny¯; τn, αq is asymptotically honest for µn, i.e.
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
αPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tµn P CIN p
?
ny¯; τn, αqu ´ p1´ αq
ˇˇ “ 0.
8Note that Fn˚ only depends on Fn and τn so it suffices to write the supremum over Fn.
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Lemma 2 (Nonrandomized selection: asymptotics of the bootstrap pivot). Assuming tFn : n ě 1u is a
sequence of distributions for which (A), (B) and (C) hold. Further assuming (D) holds, we have
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
tPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tPBp
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq ď tu ´ t
ˇˇ “ 0.
Furthermore, if we define CIBp?ny¯; τn, αq to be the set of µn such that α{2 ď PBp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq ď
1´ α{2, then CIBp?ny¯; τn, αq is asymptotically honest for µn, i.e.
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
αPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tµn P CIBp
?
ny¯; τn, αqu ´ p1´ αq
ˇˇ “ 0.
Note that the results above are under the conditional distribution Fn˚ . Tian and Taylor [2015b] show
that the TG pivot after LASSO is asymptotically uniform with a different set of assumptions. For low-
dimensional regression problems, if the selection event is affine in y (or T ), Markovic et al. [2017] gives a
more general version of Lemma 1, proving the result with Fn˚ . Tibshirani et al. [2015] proves the result
with respect to unconditional distribution Fn. Tibshirani et al. [2015] further proves that bootstrap pivot
leads to asymptotically conservative confidence intervals.
A.1.3. Post-selection consistency result
Given that y¯ is consistent pre-selection (under Fn) for µn, the following lemma shows that y¯ is also
consistent post-selection (under Fn˚ ) for µn under some conditions. Note that this results generalizes
to any consistent estimators but to keep the notation simpler we take the estimator to be y¯ and the
parameter to be µn.
Lemma 3 (Nonrandomized selection: post-selection consistency of the mean). We are given a sequence
of distribution classes tFn : n ě 1u over which y¯ is consistent pre-selection, i.e. for every  ą 0,
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
Fn t|y¯ ´ µn| ą u “ 0. Let us further assume that (A) and (D) hold. Then, y¯ is consistent
post-selection as well, i.e.
@, lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
Fn˚ t|y¯ ´ µn| ą u “ 0.
A.2. Simple example: randomized selection event
A.2.1. Randomized pivots: definitions and computations
As above, our goal is to do inference for µn after the randomized selection event
?
ny¯ ` ω ą τn,
where the randomization ω „ G is independent of y. The distribution G, with density denoted as g, is
determined by the user.
Before defining the pivots in this case, let us define two CDFs that marginalize over ω.
• If the data was Gaussian, i.e. ?ny¯ „ N p?nµn, 1q, the conditional distribution of the data would be
FN,Rn pt;
?
nµn, τnq “ pPZ„N p?nµn,1q ˆ Pω„Gq tZ ă t | Z ` ω ą τnu .
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• If the data was generated from its empirical distribution, the conditional distribution of the data would
be
FB,Rn pt;
?
nµn, τnq “ pPy‹„Fˆnn ˆ Pω„Gq
 ?
npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ă t | ?npy¯‹ ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ` ω ą τn
(
.
The pivots in these cases are defined and computed as follows.
(i) Plugin Gaussian pivot after randomized selection event is defined as
PN,Rp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq “ FN,Rn p
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq.
This pivot is introduced in Tian and Taylor [2015a]. It can be computed in following two ways.
(a) Sampling after the change of variables. The post-selection distribution of p?ny¯, ωq pair is
proportional to
fp?ny¯q ¨ gpωq ¨ It?ny¯`ωąτnu,
where f is the density of
?
ny¯ pre-selection. Based on the pre-selection asymptotic normality
?
npy¯´µnq dÑ N p0, 1q as nÑ8, where the LHS is under y „ Fnn , we can assume f is φp?nµn,1q,
the density of N p?nµn, 1q. The selective sampler of Tian et al. [2016] avoids sampling from
the density above that has the constraints on a linear combination of data and randomization.
Its idea is to do a change of variables z “ ?ny¯ ` ω. In this case the post-selection density in
terms of p?ny¯, zq becomes proportional to
fp?ny¯q ¨ gpz ´?ny¯q ¨ Itząτnu. (27)
The variable z is called the optimization variable. Note that the density above does not have
any restrictions on the data
?
ny¯ but only on z. We can sample p?ny¯, zq from the density
above by moving both p?ny¯, zq using MCMC. In practice, we often use projected Langevin to
sample. In this case, we can further marginalize over the optimization variable z and get the
post-selection density of the data as proportional to
fp?ny¯q ¨
8ż
z“τn
gpz ´?ny¯qdz “ fp?ny¯q ¨ `1´Gpτn ´?ny¯q˘ . (28)
For more complicated selection events we sample the data and the optimization variables from
a selective density [Tian et al., 2016].
(b) Approximation of selection probabilities. In this example, we sample
?
ny¯ from the density in
(28) or p?ny¯, zq from the density in (27). Another way to get the post-selective distribution of
the data is to evaluate the expression from (28) written as fptq ¨ p1´Gpτn ´ tqq over the grid
of t values, where we use t to denoted the argument in the density corresponding to random
variable
?
ny¯. Based on the set of these values over a grid, we can approximate the normalizing
constant to get the selective density of the data. This approach has been developed for more
complicated randomized selection events, including LASSO, `1-penalized regression, first step
of forward-stepwise and marginal screening [Panigrahi et al., 2017]. This is the same as that
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we weight the pre-selection density fptq with 1´Gpτn ´ tq “ Pω„Gtt` ω ą τnu, which is the
selection probability. For more complicated selection events we do not have these probabilities
over a range of t values explicitly but we use approximation of Panigrahi et al. [2016] to
compute them approximately.
(ii) Bootstrap pivot after randomized selection event is defined as
PB,Rp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq “ FB,Rn p
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq.
This pivot is introduced in Markovic and Taylor [2016]. In this case there are two ways to compute
the bootstrap pivot.
(a) Wild bootstrap. Standard wild bootstrap without selection approximates the distribution of
?
npy¯ ´ µnq with the distribution of 1?n
řn
i“1pYi ´ µnqαi where α “ pα1, . . . , αnq IID„ N p0, 1q
are bootstrap weights taken independently of the data. After selection, we write the post-
selection distribution of pz,αq as proportional to˜
nź
i“1
φp0,1qpαiq
¸
¨ g
˜
z ´ 1?
n
nÿ
i“1
pYi ´ µnqαi `?nµn
¸
¨ Itząτnu, (29)
where z is the optimization variable defined above. We sample from the density in (29) using
MCMC. This approach has been developed in Markovic and Taylor [2016].
(b) Sampling with replacement. Given B bootstrap samples pY ‹b1 , . . . , Y ‹bn q IID„ Fˆn, for all b “
1, . . . , B, the bootstrap pivot is computed as
PB,Rp?ny¯;?nµn, τnq
“
1
B
řB
b“1 Pω„G
 ?
npy¯‹b ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ` ω ą τn
(
It?npy¯‹b´y¯qď?npy¯´µnqu
1
B
řB
b“1 Pω„G t
?
npy¯‹b ´ y¯q ` ?nµn ` ω ą τnu
“
1
B
řB
b“1
`
1´Gpτn ´?npy¯‹b ´ y¯q ´ ?nµnq
˘
It?npy¯‹b´y¯qď?npy¯´µnqu
1´ 1B
řB
b“1Gpτn ´
?
npy¯‹b ´ y¯q ´ ?nµnq
.
In words, to compute the bootstrap pivot we weight each of the bootstrap samples
?
npy¯‹b´ y¯q
with the probability of the event t?npy¯‹b´ y¯q`?nµn`ω ą τnu marginalized over ω „ G only.
In these examples as well, we weight the bootstrap samples with the probabilities of selection
corresponding to those samples where the probability as above is over the randomization.
These probabilities are computed approximately using the barrier approximation of Panigrahi
et al. [2016] and the results will be presented in future work.
To invert the pivots from either (ia) or (iia) and construct a confidence interval for µn we sample once
using some estimated µn value as a reference parameter (usually MLE pre-selection). Then we tilt the
samples to get the pivots evaluated at other parameter values. To invert the pivots from either (ib) or
(iib), we evaluate the pivots separately over a grid of parameter values.
A.2.2. Asymptotics of the randomized pivots and the honest coverage post-selection
We now state the results showing that under the post-selective distribution the pivots PR and PR,B
defined above have asymptotically Unifr0, 1s distribution. We denote as F˚Rn the post-selective distribution
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of the data y „ Fnn conditional on randomized selection, marginalizing over the randomization. Also
note that the stated asymptotic results about the pivots imply the confidence intervals constructed are
uniformly honest over the corresponding classes. We do not state the coverage results separately but the
guarantees for them are the same as the ones given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Before stating the lemmas let us introduce two more assumptions. The first one is on the distance
between the mean parameter µn and the selection region. The second one assumes the distribution of the
randomization has heavier tails than Gaussian.
(E) Local alternatives assumption: there exists a constant B such that for every sequence tFn : Fn P
Fn, n ě 1u we have that the distance between the parameter ?nµn and the selection region rτn,8q
is not too big, i.e. maxtτn ´?nµpFnqq, 0u ă ∆, for some constant ∆.
(F) Lipschitz assumption on the randomization: Assume the density gpxq, x P R, is proportional to
expp´rgpxqq, x P R, where rg is a Lipschitz continuous function with smooth derivatives up to the
third order.
Depending on whether the randomization is Gaussian or with heavier tails, we need different assump-
tions for the asymptotic convergence of the plugin pivots, and thus we state these two results separately.
More explicitly, we do not need any extra assumption for Lipschitz randomization (i.e. we allow for µn
to be arbitrarily far from the selection region, implying that the constructed pivot is valid even after rare
selection events). On the other hand, we need (E) for Gaussian randomization.
Lemma 4 (Randomized selection: asymptotics of the plugin Gaussian pivot). Assume either of the two
sets of assumptions hold for the sequence tFn : n ě 1u, selection region and the randomization distribution
G:
(i) (B), (E) and G “ N p0, γ2q or
(ii) (B) and (F).
Then we have
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
tPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tPN,Rp
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq ď tu ´ t
ˇˇ “ 0.
Lemma 5 (Randomized selection: asymptotics of the bootstrap pivot). Assuming tFn : n ě 1u is such
that the assumptions (B) and (C) above hold. Further assume (E) and (F) hold. Then we have
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
sup
tPr0,1s
ˇˇ
Fn˚ tPR,Bp
?
ny¯;
?
nµn, τnq ď tu ´ t
ˇˇ “ 0.
A more general version of Lemma 4 for affine selection regions is first derived in Tian and Taylor
[2015b] under both local alternatives and heavy-tailed randomization assumptions. Markovic and Taylor
[2016] extends this result by removing the local alternatives assumption for heavy tailed randomizations
and proves the general versions of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 for affine selection regions.
A.2.3. Post-selection consistency results
Considering randomized selection event, we present some results here on post-selection consistency of
estimators. By the strong law of large numbers, y¯ is consistent for the mean µn pre-selection, i.e. with
/The philosophy of selective inference 42
respect to the pre-selection distribution of the data Fn. We state the results of Tian and Taylor [2015a],
Markovic and Taylor [2016] showing that the sample mean y¯ is consistent for the mean µn post-selection,
i.e. with respect to Fn˚ . In the case of Gaussian data and Gaussian randomization, we present a result of
Panigrahi et al. [2016] showing a different estimator, called selective MLE, is consistent post-selection.
Let us first state the results about the post-selection consistency of y¯. The case of Gaussian random-
ization requires local alternatives assumption while the case of Lipschitz randomization does not. These
results generalize to any consistent estimators [Tian and Taylor, 2015a, Markovic and Taylor, 2016].
Lemma 6 (Randomized selection: post-selection consistency of the mean). We are given a sequence
of distributions tFn : n ě 1u over which y¯ is consistent pre-selection, i.e. for every  ą 0 we have
lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
Fn t|y¯ ´ µn| ą u “ 0. Further assume either of the two following sets of assumptions holds:
(i) G “ N p0, 1q and (E) or
(ii) (F).
Then we have that the mean is consistent post-selection as well, i.e.
@, lim
nÑ8 supFnPFn
Fn˚ t|y¯ ´ µn| ą u “ 0.
In the case of Gaussian randomization, local alternatives assumption is necessary for y¯ to be consistent
for the mean µn; a counter example was given in Panigrahi et al. [2016] without the assumption. In such
scenarios when the local alternative assumption does not hold, Panigrahi et al. [2016] proposes another
estimator, called selective MLE, and they show it is consistent for the mean.
In order to define the selective MLE, let us derive the post-selection density of the data assuming
the pre-selection distributions of the data and randomization are normal, i.e. Fn “ N pµn, 1q and G “
N p0, γ2q. The post-selection joint density of p?ny¯, ωq equals to
φp0,1qp?npy¯ ´ µnqq ¨ φp0,1qpω{γq
pP?ny¯„N p?nµn,1q ˆ Pω„N p0,γ2qq t
?
ny¯ ` ω ą τnu ¨ It
?
ny¯`ωąτnu.
Marginalizing over ω, the post-selective density of
?
ny¯ equals to
φp0,1qp?npy¯ ´ µnqq
1´ Φ
ˆ
τn´?nµn?
1`γ2
˙ ¨ Pω„N p0,γ2q  ?ny¯ ` ω ą τn( . (30)
The selective MLE in this case is defined as the value µˆn that maximizes the above density with respect
to µn, i.e. µˆn satisfies
?
npy¯ ´ µˆnq “
φp0,1q
ˆ
τn´?nµˆn?
1`γ2
˙
1´ Φ
ˆ
τn´?nµˆn?
1`γ2
˙ ¨ 1a
1` γ2
by setting the derivative of the logarithm of the density in (30) with respect to µn to zero.
We now state the result saying the selective MLE is consistent for the mean parameter in the case of
Gaussian randomization and Gaussian data.
Lemma 7. (Gaussian randomization and Gaussian data: consistency of selective MLE
post-selection) Assuming Fn “ N pµ, 1q for all n, and G “ N p0, γ2q, we have
@ ą 0, lim
nÑ8Fn˚ t|µˆn ´ µ| ą u “ 0.
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Note that the sequence of mean parameters does not change with n, i.e. µn “ µ for all n ě 1. This
result is presented in Panigrahi et al. [2016] for regression problems and general affine selection events.
Also note that computing selective MLE requires knowing the probability of selection which has explicit
form in the simple problem presented here. In more complicated selection problems, that is not the
case. Panigrahi et al. [2016] propose using an approximation to this selection probability. They call the
resulting estimator approximate selective MLE and prove it is also consistent under the same assumptions
as above.
